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Abstract. The issues of improving the security of the modular system for collecting, storing 
and processing telemetric information on the state of the onboard subsystems of the aircraft in 
automatic mode are considered. It is based on an analysis of the use of modern technologies for 
the protection and processing of telemetric information to ensure certain aspects of the 
guaranteeability of the system as a whole. 
1. Introduction 
Emerging malfunctions and pre-failure states of the onboard equipment of the aircraft can be 
diagnosed based on telemetric information (TMI). This allows the specialists of ground technical 
services to plan repair and preventive measures based on an assessment of the current state of the 
equipment. Accumulated and processed TMI will allow specialists of the manufacturer to provide 
reasonable support to engineers of ground services in making decisions in case of technical failure of 
the blocks and modules of the aircraft. TMI analysis will improve the operational efficiency of the 
aircraft in case of any malfunctions and attacks by intruders. 
The aim of the study is to increase the security of the system for collecting, storing and processing 
TMI on the state of the onboard aircraft subsystems in automatic mode. It is based on an analysis of 
the use of modern (including intellectual) technologies for the protection and processing of TMI. 
To achieve this goal, a structural diagram of a protected system for collecting, storing and processing 
telemetric information on the state of the aircraft subsystems on the basis of a modular principle has 
been developed. 
2. Analysis of the problem of secure collection, storage and processing of TMI in a 
geographically distributed information system 
The proposed automated information system (AIS) of ground maintenance services is a set of software 
and hardware. They are necessary for the reception, storage and processing of information about the 
parameters of the state of complex technical products (CTP) on the aircraft. AIS is a geographically 
distributed system that combines the infrastructure of the information systems of ground-based 
maintenance stations and the information system of the manufacturer through secure communication 
channels. Preparation TMI realized by reading a status log for CTP aircraft during inspection and 
maintenance at ground stations via wireless and / or wired sensor networks.  
The dependability of the TMI transmission systems with an aircraft allows for a comprehensive 
solution of the tasks of ensuring reliability, fault tolerance, availability, security, maintainability, and 
observability. An urgent task is to build a hierarchy of models that allow a comprehensive assessment 
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of various aspects of the TMI transmission system and the development of a methodology for 
assessing the integral indicator of the system’s guaranteed performance. 
Ensuring the availability of TMI transmission systems is the primary task of ensuring the effective 
functioning of the aircraft (LA). The volume of TMI collected is significant. It is an incentive for the 
development of the concept of the industrial Internet of things (IIoT). It is a promising platform for use 
in solving such problems [1]. For example, a jet airliner demonstrated at the Bombardier Paris Air 
Show, whose engine is equipped with more than 5,000 sensors that generate up to 10 GB of data per 
second. One twin-engine aircraft can generate up to 844 TB of data average in 12-hour flight [2]. 
The ability to transfer TMI about the actual state of individual modules during operation and the entire 
LA equipment complex in real time to the manufacturer of aeronautical engineering components will 
improve the operational efficiency of the aircraft in its normal state and in the event of malfunctions 
and attacks by intruders when investigating incidents. Thus, a study of ground-to-air communication 
systems showed that ACARS, despite its versatility and widespread use, is vulnerable, and if hacked in 
conjunction with ADS-B, an attacker can gain access to the flight control system, download flight 
plans and detailed commands [3]. 
Ensuring the availability of telemetry information on the state of the aircraft 
An automated information system (AIS) of ground maintenance services is a set of software and 
hardware. They are necessary for receiving, storing and processing information on the technological 
parameters of complex technical products (CTP) on board the aircraft. 
A review of the main approaches to the relevance of the problem of ensuring the reliability of such 
systems is considered in the works of the authors [4, 5, 6]. AIS solves the main problems associated 
with the reception of TMI on the state of the onboard aircraft systems. The main methods of obtaining 
data are presented in the figure (Figure 1): 
1. Directly from the CTP 
2. By means of reading devices of the event log from the sensors of modules CTP. When carrying 
out technical inspection and maintenance, devices of this type read and store data on the state of the 
modules throughout the entire previous period of operation [5]. 
3. Entering events into the database manually. The operator processes the information and enters 
the information through the WEB application [4]. 
 
Figure 1. Methods for obtaining TMI. 
In the first case, telemetry information is transmitted from the aircraft through a radio channel. To 
create a transmission channel, the following approaches can be used: 
• Communication satellites (IRIDIUM, SATCOM). 
Existing telemetry data transmission technologies use satellite communications. For example, the GE 
Aviation concern, producing aircraft engines, transmits telemetry from the aircraft in this way. 
The obvious disadvantage of such way of transfer is its high cost. Streaming telemetry information 
involves the transfer of significant amounts (gigabytes) of data sent. The second disadvantage is the 
low noise immunity of the satellite communication channel. Incorrectly transmitted data can serve as a 
signal for a false alarm, or there is a chance to miss a system failure. 
• Channel of wireless high-speed data transmission LTE and LTE-a. 
Air to ground (A2G) LTE is capable of providing data rates of up to 75 Mbps for ground-to-air 
communications and up to 25 Mbps for air-to-ground communications at distances of 100 kilometers 
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and speeds of 1,200 kilometers per hour using licenses. FDD 2x15 MHz. The standard 4G LTE can be 
used for continental flights, developed by Nokia.  
Despite the currently available satellite and hybrid A2G systems, there is still no low-cost, high-
throughput solution for broadband in-flight. 
Thus, none of these technologies has no set of properties that allow for continuous broadcast telemetry 
data. ACARS does not allow to transfer a large amount of accumulated data, satellite communication 
is too expensive, and LTE-A is still at the development and implementation stage, and in the future it 
will cover only the continental part of flights.  
Moreover, the current TMI transmission and processing systems demonstrate vulnerabilities that allow 
an attacker to gain access not only to passenger and airline data, but also to significantly affect flight 
parameters. 
In the second and third cases, the information enters the database through a WEB application, which is 
an insulating layer between external networks and the internal structure of the AIS, since access from 
the external network is one of the most vulnerable points of the system. Improving the security of 
access to the database (DB) containing critical information about the product in use is based on the 
development of the architecture of a secure WEB application that acts as an insulating layer for 
external AIS clients, which allows for the possibility of transferring and analyzing ground-based 
service points from the aircraft and provide the ability to remotely access the necessary data. The 
architecture of this solution is presented in [5]. 
Preventing the appearance of vulnerabilities in the WEB application was carried out by implementing 
measures to develop secure software established by GOST R ISO / IEC 12207. Modeling security 
threats and identified vectors of possible attacks, as well as analyzing them, made it possible to 
formulate countermeasures for each of the vectors at different architectural levels WEB-applications. 
However, the analysis of the security of the entire TMI transmission system requires advanced 
modeling and the construction of a detailed model of interaction between the onboard information 
system of the aircraft and the ground-based AIS. 
The growth of telemetry information forces the aviation industry to consider new approaches to the 
collection and analysis of a large amount of data on the state of individual components and elements 
of the aircraft. The concept of the industrial Internet of Things is being actively developed - an 
expanded network consisting of a large number of devices equipped with a set of sensors that 
communicate with each other through low-power and short-term wireless connections. The first step is 
to collect data from the sensors. One of the most promising solutions is a protocol with low power 
consumption and small radius of IEEE 802.15.4 IEEE 802.15.4e transmission. Short range is sufficient 
for data transmission within the ground service station. The IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.15.4e 
protocols and their architecture layers comply with IETF standards. 
The question of analyzing the security of the system for collecting, transmitting and receiving 
telemetry information about the state of individual elements of the onboard aircraft systems during 
data transmission over the first two channels remains open. 
The decomposition of the TMI transfer in the form of a hierarchical model of interacting levels of 
collecting, transmitting and analyzing information with the corresponding protocol stack is the basis 
for analyzing and building a system for analyzing the transmission system security (Figure 2). 
In recent years, satellite communication systems in accordance with the Regulations of the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) are switching to a higher-frequency Ka-band (15.40-
26.50 and 27.00-30.20 GHz). 
The grouping of satellites in geostationary orbit and ground control centers make it possible to form a 
network infrastructure with high reliability indicators and the possibility of building distributed state 
networks. Channels of transmission of such networks provide a fairly high level of encryption and data 
protection. 
Transmission of information in such networks is characterized by a low level of errors - no more than 
one per 10 million transmitted information bits and reliable operation - up to 100 thousand hours. The 
speed of work on the satellite channel is from 16 Kbps to 10 Mbps and more, which is comparable 
with the data transfer rate in the terrestrial channel. 
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The main methods for ensuring the security of telemetry information transmission in a wireless 
satellite channel is the use of software and hardware means of information protection. Widely used 
standards for secure protocols IPsec.  
IPsec protocol (set of protocols) provides: 
• integrity of the virtual connection, authentication of the source of information using the AH 
protocol (Authentication Header); 
• encryption of information transmitted via the ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) protocol; 
• initial connection setup, mutual authentication and confidential key exchange. 
 
Figure 2. Extended scheme of data transmission from the aircraft. 
At present, modern bilateral satellite communication networks use coding systems at the software and 
hardware level, which makes the interception and decoding of information over the radio channel 
almost impossible. 
All data transmitted via satellite channel pass through a multi-stage system of transformation and 
encryption. The result of this: 
• application of proprietary data encryption algorithms; 
• terminal authentication when it is registered on the operator’s network (hardware key); 
• encryption of both the entire session (software key) and each session separately (session keys); 
• application of proprietary algorithms for converting source data into internal data formats 
(structures), which are then transmitted via satellite channel; thus, the tasks of additional 
protection of information, delivery of service information and error correction are solved; 
• in the created virtual channels, source data in TCP sessions are grouped, compressed, and 
prioritized. 
Satellite channels in the direction from LA to TMI processing centers are reverse satellite channels. 
Currently, the most common ways of functioning of transmitters in such channels are the principles of 
access with time-frequency division of TDMA / FDMA channels. Each reverse channel is located in a 
certain frequency range or has a carrier with frequency modulation and with a given coding algorithm 
for detecting and correcting errors of transmitted data - Turbo Coding. 
To transmit TMI from the aircraft, it is necessary to provide a mechanism for changing the frequencies 
of the carrier reverse channels, which makes it much more difficult to intercept the transmitted data. 
Data encryption in the satellite channel is carried out with the participation of both satellite terminals 
on board the aircraft and specialized high-performance servers at the TMI ground collection station. 
The server of the ground station for collection and processing of TMI hosts a secure database of 
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encryption keys and session keys of all satellite terminals. In order for the aircraft board to operate in 
the transmission network, the information in the key database must match the hardware onboard key. 
Telecommunications systems using the UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) 
standards are third-generation mobile communication systems - 3G. For mobile communication of the 
third generation, the decimeter frequency band is used (about 2 GHz), and data transmission is 
provided at a speed of 2 Mbit / s. 
All information security threats in the UMTS network can be distributed depending on the location of 
the impact of their respective attacks:  
• on the radio access area (radio interface); 
• on other parts of the network. 
The radio section between the aircraft and the service network is one of the most vulnerable points of 
attack in UMTS. The threats related to this site and described below are divided into the following 
categories: 
• unauthorized access to data; 
• threats to data integrity; 
• “denial of service”; 
• unauthorized access to services. 
Below are tables with descriptions of information security threats. The accepted designations of the 
threat TAn correspond to: T - the first letter of the English word "threat" (threat): A - the number 
corresponds to the number of the threat group (table number); n - the letter corresponds to the ordinal 
number of the threat in the threat group (in accordance with the list of threats in the ETSI document. 
 
Table1. Describes some of the threats to unauthorized access to data on the radio site. 
Threat 
designation Threat name Threat description 
Т1а Interception of user traffic Violators can intercept user traffic 
Т1b Interception of alarm and 
control data 
Violators can intercept alarm data and control data 
Т1с Masking as a participant Violators can be disguised as a network element 
Т1d Passive traffic analysis Violators can monitor the characteristics of messages 
Т1е Active traffic analysis Violators can actively initiate a connection and then 
access information 
 
Table 2. Threats to the integrity of information. 
Threat 
designation Threat name Threat description 
Т2а User traffic manipulation Violators can modify, insert, repeat or destroy user 
traffic. This manipulation may be accidental or 
intentional. 
Т2b Alarm data manipulation The intruder can modify, insert, repeat, or destroy 
alarm or control data. 
Table 3. Denial of service threats. 
Threat 
designation Threat name Threat description 
Т3а Physical intervention Violators can physically interfere with the 
transmission of user traffic, signaling data and control 
data. 
Т3b Protocol Intervention Violators may introduce special protocol failures. 
Т3с Denial of service due to 
masking as a participant in 
communication 
Violators may refuse to serve a legitimate user. 
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Table 4. Threat of unauthorized access to services. 
Threat 
designation Threat name Threat description 
Т4а Masking as another user The intruder is disguised as another network user. First, the 
intruder is disguised as a base station with respect to the 
user. 
3. Threats related to attacks on other parts of the system 
Although attacks on a radio channel represent the most serious threats, attacks on other parts of the 
system also require analysis from the point of view of information security. 
 
Table 5. Threats to unauthorized access to data. 
Threat 
designation Threat name Threat description 
T5e Unauthorized access to data on 
the system object 
Violators (by physical influence or logical control) can gain 
access to local or remote data. 
T5f Compromising information about 
the location 
A legitimate user of a UMTS service may obtain 
information about the location of other users of the system 
T6с Manipulation of masking as a 
communication partner 
Violators can be disguised as a network element in order to 
modify, insert, repeat or destroy traffic 
T6f Manipulation of data on the 
objects of the system 
Violators can modify, insert, destroy data that is contained 
in the objects of the system. 
T7а Physical intervention Violators may interfere with transmission on any system 
interface (wired or wireless). For example, the physical 
method of an obstacle on a wired interface could be a 
broken wire. 
T7b Protocol intervention Violators can interfere with the transmission of user traffic 
or signaling data on any interface of the system (wired or 
wireless) or by signaling the protocol to fail. 
T7с Denial of service by masking 
communication partners 
Violators can deny service to users by impeding the 
transmission of user traffic and signaling data, controlling 
them by blocking as a result of masking as a network 
element. 
T7d Incorrect use of emergency 
services 
Violators can interfere with access to the services of other 
users and at the same time cause disruption of the 
equipment to perform functions in emergency situations. 
T8а Disagreement with the submitted 
invoice 
Disagreement with the submitted invoice. This may be 
expressed in the refusal of the service or in the refusal that 
the service was actually provided. 
T8b Failure of user traffic source The user can refuse to send traffic. 
T9а Custom masking Violators can introduce themselves as a user in order to use 
the authorized services of this user. The intruder was able to 
get this opportunity from other objects such as the serving 
network, home environment and even the user himself. 
T9b Masking under the serving 
network 
Violators can introduce themselves as a service network or 
part of a service network infrastructure. 
T9с Home environment masking Violators can introduce themselves as a home environment 
in order to obtain information that enables them to disguise 
themselves as users. 
T9d Misuse of user priorities Users may misuse their assigned priorities in order to gain 
unauthorized access to services or simply use their 
subscription intensively for free. 
T9е Incorrect use of serving network 
priorities 
Service networks may misuse their priorities to gain 
unauthorized access to services. 
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Table 6. Threats related to attacks on the terminal and UICC / USIM. 
Threat 
designation Threat name Threat description 
T10h Masking to receive data on 
the UICC interface - terminal. 
Violators can be disguised as USIM or a terminal in 
order to intercept data on the interface of a UICC 
terminal. 
T10j Confidentiality of certain user 
data in the terminal and UICC 
/ USIM 
Violators may wish to gain access to personal user 
data stored in the terminal or UICC, for example, the 




It must be possible to prevent 
unauthorized access to 3G 
services by disguising 
themselves as legitimate 
users. 






An alarm should be provided 
to the provider informing him 
of the security event. Provide 
service providers with the 
ability to authenticate users 
upon request and during the 





unauthorized modification of 
user traffic should be 
provided. 





unauthorized modification of 
certain signaling and control 
data must be provided. 
System integrity requirements 
T1a,  
Т1b 
The user should be provided 
with the ability to verify that 
his traffic and information 
about his calls are 
confidential. 
Personal data protection requirement 
T10h,  
T10k 
It should not be possible to 
access USIM data that is 
intended for use only within 
USIM, such as authentication 
keys and algorithms 
USIM security requirement 
4. Development of a block diagram of a secure system for collecting, storing and processing 
telemetric information on the state of the aircraft subsystem 
The generalized structure of a geographically distributed hierarchical system for the collection, storage 
and processing of TMIs arriving from airplanes based on ground maintenance stations is presented in 
Figure 4. 
The creation of a secure channel through global communication networks and the transfer of TMI to a 
part of the AIS EM is realized at the transmission level of accumulated data. Organization levels of 
reception and distribution of information at the enterprise are realized according to the three-layer 
CISCO model. There is a level in the corporate information network of EM. It includes subsystems for 
storage and processing of TMI. Also, there is a segment designed to support and implement the 
business processes of the enterprise. 
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Figure 4. Generalized structural diagram of a protected system for collecting, storing and processing 
TMI (1 – level of TMI collection from wired and wireless sensors of ground-based aircraft servicing 
systems; 2 – level of primary surveillance and preparation of TMI for transmission to the AIS of the 
manufacturer’s enterprise (AIS EM); 3 – level of data transmission over secure channels through 
global data networks in the AISEM; 4 – level of organization of reception and distribution of TMI on 
EM; 5 – level of storage and processing of TMI in the CIS). 
5. Development of the structure of the collection and storage subsystem TMI at the ground 
stations of aircraft maintenance 
The vast majority of Industrial Ethernet protocols do not have built-in security mechanisms. 
Consequently, the actual problem is the security of industrial networks. 
To ensure the security of subsystems that implement the first two levels of the proposed structure, it is 
necessary to be guided by the normative documents of the international and federal standards. When 
designing the wireless sensor network collection subsystem of the TMI, take into account the 
requirements of GOST R ISO / IEC 27033-1-2011 and GOST R ISO / IEC 27033-3-2014. 
The physical architecture of the TMI collection and storage subsystem at the ground is presented in 
Figure 5. 
Mechanisms for collecting and storing a large amount of TMI on the state of individual components 
and elements of aircraft should take into account the actively developing concepts of the industrial 
Internet of things (IIoT). It is proposed to use heterogeneous wired (physical RS-485 interface) and 
wireless sensor networks (IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.15.4e) to collect protocol-based TMI using 
embedded Modbus over TCP mechanisms to ensure the protection of transmitted data (streaming 
encryption). The IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.15.4e protocols and their architecture levels follow the 
IETF standards. 
6. Development of the structure of the subsystem for receiving, storing and processing TMI in 
AIS 
The organizations for receiving and distributing TMIs on PIs are implemented according to the three-
tier CISCO model and Security Architecture for Enterprise (SAFE) design methodology, which allows 
to take into account modern experience in deploying secure networks based on the deep-echelon 
defense against external and internal attacks. 
The main element of the TMI distributed processing system is the distributed file system HDFS. 
Additional measures to ensure the confidentiality of stored data is encryption at the level of individual 
database columns. To audit access to big data, you need to apply Database Activity Monitoring class 
solutions. 
7. The concept of data integrity and verification of data sources 
The actual problem is the security of industrial networks, which is not solved by existing approaches, 
since the attacker's intervention is possible not only at the network level from outside or inside, but 
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also at the level of the data sources themselves. The main hardware and software part of the CTP is 
free from possible "bookmarks", which is guaranteed by the manufacturer, but it is necessary to 
comprehensively analyze the progress of the object, identifying abnormal situations not related to 
equipment breakdowns or failure of individual components and assemblies, but potentially caused by 
the intervention of an attacker. 
 
Figure 5. The subsystem of data collection and storage at aircraft service stations. 
 
It is necessary to improve the monitoring system of CTP as an element of the intrusion detection 
system, considering the complexity of the control object, the nonlinearity of the processes and the 
possible conditions of the equipment that lead to emergency or catastrophic situations. The system of 
monitoring the condition of CTP, implemented as a component of the intrusion detection system, 
involves continuous monitoring of the parameters of CTP to identify significant deviations from the" 
normal behavior", which in turn will indicate possible malicious intentions. This approach is a 
development of the concept of Data Centric Security [7], which implies the security of the data itself. 
To determine deviations from the" normal behavior " it is proposed to use the system model of the 
object – the CTP, which is the development of the concept of Fault Detection and Identification [8]. 
The process of monitoring the state of the CTP is a sequential operation of collection, processing and 
analysis of technological information, the main of which is to detect the impact of an attacker on the 
course of the CTP and the components of the information system by comparing the mathematical 
model of the CTP and the current performance of the real object will improve the security of the 
object. Using the proposed concept of monitoring the CTP comparing the fixed state of the object with 
the real model is a tool that allows you to control the presence of hardware and software interventions 
in the infrastructure of the information system. 
8. Conclusion 
A block diagram of a protected system for collecting, storing and processing telemetric information on 
the state of aircraft subsystems based on the modular principle is proposed. The difference of the 
proposed solution is that it contains rather large subsystems with a high degree of connectivity of the 
components inside and a sufficient degree of autonomy at the level of interaction of the subsystems 
themselves. Each subsystem is built on the basis of organizational principles specific to the specifics 
of the problem being solved, and is governed by existing regulatory documents to ensure specific 
aspects of the system's reliability. 
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